

Combating Corruption in Asian Countries: What Lessons Have We Learnt?*

Jon S.T. Quah

Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore

Abstract

Corruption remains a serious problem in many Asian countries today in spite of the various anti-corruption measures introduced by them during the past six decades. Except for Singapore and Hong Kong, which are perceived to be the least corrupt countries in Asia, many countries have failed to curb corruption effectively. There are seven lessons to be learnt from the experiences of Asian countries in curbing corruption namely: (1) the critical role of political will; (2) reliance on a single anti-corruption agency instead of multiple agencies; (3) do not rely on the police to curb corruption; (4) prevent corruption by paying civil servants and political leaders adequate salaries; (5) enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially, not selectively; (6) do not use corruption as a weapon against the political opponents of the incumbent government; and (7) punish those found guilty of corruption instead of rewarding them. In short, to combat corruption effectively, Asian countries must adopt these seven lessons as part of their anti-corruption strategies.

Introduction

More than 40 years ago, Gunnar Myrdal (1970, pp. 230-231), the Swedish economist, focused on the research taboo on corruption in South Asian countries, which was responsible for the substantial research gap, to "explain why the taboo should be broken" by analyzing the "folklore of corruption," the causes of corruption, and anti-corruption campaigns in these countries. While the research taboo on corruption in Asian countries has been gradually eroded since the 1990s by the proliferation of country studies, the fact is that corruption remains a serious problem today in many Asian countries in spite of their attempts to curb it during the past six decades.

An analysis of the corruption studies in Asia in 2009 found that "country studies dominate the literature as only 93 (7.15 per cent) of the 1,312 studies are comparative in nature." Furthermore, most of the country studies were conducted on China (14.23 per cent), Japan (11.38 per cent), Philippines (10.92 per cent), India (10.53 per cent), and Indonesia (9.23 per cent). Surprisingly, only 56 studies (4.30 per cent) were done on Hong Kong, and 60 studies (4.46 per cent) on Singapore, even though they are the most effective Asian countries in curbing corruption (Quah, 2009a, pp. 18-19)

* This is the revised version of the author's Keynote Address delivered at the Eighth Annual Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Hong Kong at the Hong Kong Institute of Education in Hong Kong on March 8, 2013.

What lessons can we learn from the experiences of the Asian countries in combating corruption during the past 60 years? This article contends that seven lessons can be learnt from an analysis of the successes and failures in the various attempts by Asian countries to curb corruption. However, before identifying these lessons, it is necessary to demonstrate that corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries by referring to their performance on five direct and indirect indicators of corruption.

Corruption is Widespread in Many Asian Countries

These five indicators will be used to confirm that corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries: (1) Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 2012 covering 176 countries; (2) Political Economic Risk Consultancy's (PERC's) 2012 annual survey of 16 countries; (3) World Bank's Control of Corruption governance indicator in 2011 covering 215 countries; (4) World Bank's *Doing Business Survey* in 2012 covering 183 economies; and (5) *Global Competitiveness Report's* indicator on the Public Trust of Politicians in 2012 covering 142 countries.

Corruption Perceptions Index of 2012

Table 1: Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 for 26 Asian Countries

Country	CPI Rank (1-176)	CPI Score (0-100)
Singapore	5 th	87
Hong Kong SAR	14 th	77
Japan	17 th	74
Bhutan	33 rd	63
Taiwan	37 th	61
South Korea	45 th	56
Brunei Darussalam	46 th	55
Malaysia	54 th	49
Sri Lanka	79 th	40
China	80 th	39
Thailand	88 th	37
India	94 th	36
Mongolia	94 th	36
Philippines	105 th	34
Timor-Leste	113 th	33
Indonesia	118 th	32
Vietnam	123 rd	31
Nepal	139 th	27
Pakistan	139 th	27
Bangladesh	144 th	26
Papua New Guinea	150 th	25
Cambodia	157 th	22
Laos	160 th	21
Myanmar	172 nd	15
Afghanistan	174 th	8
North Korea	174 th	8

Source: <http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results/>.

Table 2: 26 Asian Countries by 2012 CPI Scores

CPI Score	Countries	Number (%)
80-100 (A)	Singapore (87)	1 (3.8%)
70-79 (B)	Hong Kong (77) Japan (74)	2 (7.7%)
60-69 (C)	Bhutan (63) Taiwan (61)	2 (7.7%)
50-59 (D)	South Korea (56) Brunei (55)	2 (7.7%)
40-49 (E)	Malaysia (49) Sri Lanka (40)	2 (7.7%)
30-39 (F)	China (39) Thailand (37) India, Mongolia (36) Philippines (34) Timor-Leste (33) Indonesia (32) Vietnam (31)	8 (30.8%)
20-29 (F)	Nepal, Pakistan(27) Bangladesh (26) Papua New Guinea (25) Cambodia (22) Laos (21)	6 (23.1%)
0-19 (F)	Afghanistan, North Korea (8) Myanmar (15)	3 (11.5%)

Source: Compiled from Table 1.

Tables 1 and 2 confirm that 19 of the 26 Asian countries (or 73.1 per cent) included in Transparency International's 2012 CPI have high levels of perceived corruption as their CPI scores are below 50. Of the remaining seven countries, Singapore is ranked 5th with a CPI score of 87, followed by Hong Kong (14th, 77), Japan (17th, 74), Bhutan (33rd, 63), Taiwan (37th, 61), South Korea (45th, 56) and Brunei (46th, 55).

PERC's 2012 Survey on Corruption

Similarly, PERC's 2012 survey on corruption shows that among the 16 countries surveyed, only four Asian countries—Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and Macao—have scores ranging from 0.67 to 2.85. The other 10 Asian countries have higher levels of perceived corruption varying from Taiwan (7th with a score of 5.45) to the Philippines (16th with a score of 9.35). The remaining two countries are Australia (2nd with a score of 1.28) and the United States (4th with a score of 2.59).

Table 3: PERC Survey of 16 Asia-Pacific Countries, 2012

Country	PERC Rank (1-16)	PERC Score (0-10)*
Singapore	1 st	0.67
Australia	2 nd	1.28
Japan	3 rd	1.90
USA	4 th	2.59
Hong Kong	5 th	2.64
Macao	6 th	2.85
Taiwan	7 th	5.45
Malaysia	8 th	5.59
Thailand	9 th	6.57
Cambodia	10 th	6.83
South Korea	11 th	6.90
China	12 th	7.00
Vietnam	13 th	7.75
Indonesia	14 th	8.50
India	15 th	8.75
Philippines	16 th	9.35

Source: PERC (2012, p. 4).

* The score ranges from 0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt).

Control of Corruption, Ease of Doing Business, and Public Trust of Politicians

The same trend can be observed in the performance of the Asian countries on the other three indicators, as shown in Table 4. According to the World Bank's 2011 Control of Corruption governance indicator, only seven countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Bhutan and South Korea) have a percentile rank above 70. The other 19 Asian countries (73.1 per cent) have percentile ranks ranging from 57.8 (for Malaysia) to 0.5 (for Myanmar).

For the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Rank in 2012, the seven Asian countries which have performed well are: Singapore (1st), Hong Kong (2nd), South Korea (8th), Thailand (17th), Malaysia (18th), Japan (20th) and Taiwan (25th). On the other hand, Brunei and Bhutan have not performed well as they are ranked 83rd and 142nd respectively in terms of the ease of doing business in 2012.

Finally, the 20 Asian countries included in the *Global Competitiveness Report's* indicator of Public Trust of Politicians in 2012, have not performed well with the exception of Singapore, which is ranked first among 144 countries with a score of 6.3. The second best-performing Asian country is Brunei (14th with a score of 4.9), followed by Malaysia (17th with a score of 4.4), Taiwan (20th with a score of 4.3), Hong Kong (24th with a score of 4.1) and China (26th with a score of 4.1). In contrast, the level of public trust of politicians in Japan and South Korea is very low, as reflected in Japan's 57th ranking and score of 3.1 and South Korea's 117th ranking and score of 2.1.

Table 4: Performance of Asian Countries on Control of Corruption 2011, Ease of Doing Business 2012, and Public Trust of Politicians 2012

Country	Control of Corruption 2011 (percentile rank)	Ease of Doing Business Rank 2012	Public Trust of Politicians Rank & Score 2012
Singapore	96.2	1 st	1 st (6.3)
Hong Kong	94.3	2 nd	24 th (4.1)
Japan	90.5	20 th	57 th (3.1)
Taiwan	77.7	25 th	20 th (4.3)
Brunei	77.3	83 rd	14 th (4.9)
Bhutan	73.9	142 nd	NA
South Korea	70.1	8 th	117 th (2.1)
Malaysia	57.8	18 th	17 th (4.4)
Sri Lanka	40.8	89 th	112 th (2.1)
China	28.9	91 st	26 th (4.1)
Thailand	44.5	17 th	107 th (2.2)
India	44.5	132 nd	106 th (2.2)
Indonesia	35.1	129 th	60 th (3.0)
Mongolia	27.5	86 th	114 th (2.1)
Philippines	27.0	136 th	95 th (2.4)

Timor-Leste	22.7	168 th	56 th (3.1)
Vietnam	29.9	98 th	42 nd (3.4)
Nepal	23.7	107 th	125 th (1.9)
Pakistan	15.6	105 th	99 th (2.3)
Bangladesh	16.1	122 nd	124 th (1.9)
Papua New Guinea	11.4	101 st	NA
Cambodia	12.8	138 th	34 th (3.7)
Laos	13.7	165 th	NA
Myanmar	0.5	NA	NA
Afghanistan	1.4	160 th	NA
North Korea	2.8	NA	NA
Sample size	215	183	144

Sources: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp; World Bank (2012, p. 6); and Schwab (2012, p. 391).

In sum, according to the five indicators above, corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries because: (1) only seven countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Bhutan, Taiwan, South Korea and Brunei) or 26.9 per cent have attained a CPI score of above 50 in 2012, which means that the remaining 19 countries (73.1 per cent) have CPI scores below 50; (2) only Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong and Macao have PERC scores ranging between 0.67 to 2.85 in 2012; (3) only seven countries (Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Bhutan and South Korea) have percentile ranks above 70 on the World Bank's control of corruption indicator in 2011; (4) only Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Japan and Taiwan are among the top 25 economies on the World Bank's ease of doing business rank in 2012; and (5) the top five Asian countries on the *Global Competitiveness Report's* public trust in politicians indicator in 2012 are: Singapore (1st); Brunei Darussalam (14th); Malaysia (17th); Taiwan (20th); and Hong Kong (24th).

Lesson 1: Political Will is Critical for Success in Combating Corruption

The success of Singapore and Hong Kong in combating corruption has shown clearly the critical importance of political will in curbing corruption. Indeed, political will is important in the war on corruption because:

The principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they wish to do so are [the] politicians. This is because they make the laws and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced. If, however, politicians at the top of the hierarchy have routinely worked their way up by accepting bribes to fund their parties and themselves, there is little prospect that they will wish to cleanse their colleagues or their nation of corruption... The very people who are the greatest beneficiaries of corruption have the greatest power and use the corrupt nature of government to maintain that power (Senior, 2006, pp. 184 and 187).

Defining political will as "the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level," Sahr J. Kpundeh (1998, p. 92) contends that it is "a critical starting point for sustainable and effective programmes" because "without it, government's statements to reform civil service, strengthen transparency and accountability and reinvent the relationship between government and private industry remain mere rhetoric."

Political will is the most important prerequisite as a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy will be doomed to failure if it is not supported by the political leadership in a country. Without political will, inadequate personnel and budget will be allocated to the anti-corruption effort, and the anti-corruption laws will not be enforced impartially by the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) (Quah, 2011, p. 454). To assess the political will of a government in curbing corruption, these two indicators can be used: (1) the per capita expenditure of the lead ACA (if there are many ACAs) is calculated by dividing its budget for a selected year by the population in the country for the same year; and (2) the staff-population ratio for the same ACA by calculating the ratio of the population in the country for the selected year that are served by the number of personnel in the ACA for the same year (Quah, 2009b, pp. 181-182).

Table 5: Per Capita Expenditure of Nine Asian ACAs in 2008

ACA	Budget (US \$ million)	Population (million)	Per Capita Expenditure	Rank
ICAC (Hong Kong)	97.7	7.3	13.40	1
CPIB (Singapore)	11.2	4.83	2.32	2
ACRC (South Korea)	61	48.4	1.26	3
IAAC (Mongolia)	3.1	2.7	1.15	4
NACC (Thailand)	21.3	64.3	0.33	5
OMB (Philippines)	19.6	89.7	0.22	6
MJIB (Taiwan)	4.02	22.9	0.18	7
KPK (Indonesia)	31.8	234.3	0.14	8
CBI (India)	52.1	1,186.2	0.04	9

Source: Quah (2011, p. 455).

Table 5 shows that among the nine countries, only the ACAs in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Mongolia have per capita expenditures exceeding US\$1.00. Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) is ranked first with a per capita expenditure of US\$13.40, followed by Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (US\$2.32), South Korea's Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) (US\$1.26) and Mongolia's Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) (US\$1.15).

Table 6: Staff-Population Ratios of Nine ACAs in 2008

ACA	Personnel	Population (million)	Staff-Population Ratio	Rank
ICAC	1,263	7.3	1: 5,780	1 st
MJIB	840	22.9	1: 27,262	2 nd
IAAC	90	2.7	1: 30,000	3 rd
CPIB	86	4.83	1: 56,163	4 th
NACC	740	64.3	1: 86,892	5 th
OMB	1,007	89.7	1: 89,076	6 th
ACRC	466	48.4	1: 103,863	7 th
CBI	4,874	1,186.2	1: 243,373	8 th
KPK	540	234.3	1: 433,888	9 th

Source: Quah (2011, p. 456).

Table 6 shows that the staff-population ratios of the nine Asian ACAs range from 1: 5,780 for the ICAC in Hong Kong to 1: 433,888 for the *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* (KPK) in Indonesia. Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) has the second most favourable staff-population ratio of 1: 27,262, followed by Mongolia's IAAC's staff-population ratio of 1: 30,000, and Singapore's CPIB's staff-population ratio of 1: 56,163.

Lesson 2: Rely on a Single ACA, not Multiple ACAs

In my 2006 regional overview report prepared for Transparency International, I observed that among the nine Asian countries surveyed, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thailand and South Korea have relied on a single ACA, while Cambodia, China, Philippines and Vietnam have depended instead on multiple ACAs. Japan is the only country which does not rely on any ACA to curb corruption (Quah, 2007a, pp. 4-6).

Asian countries have relied on three patterns of corruption control, depending on the anti-corruption measures employed. The first pattern, which is the least popular and ineffective, is employed by Japan, which does not rely on any ACA to implement the anti-corruption laws. The second pattern of corruption control relies on multiple ACAs to implement the anti-corruption laws and is practiced in Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. The third and most popular pattern of corruption control is the reliance on a single ACA to implement the anti-corruption laws in 15 Asian countries, as shown in Table 7.

Table 7: Patterns of Corruption Control in 23 Asian Countries

Pattern of Corruption Control	Countries
Anti-corruption laws without an independent ACA	Japan
Anti-corruption laws with multiple ACAs	Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam
Anti-corruption laws with an independent ACA	Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Brunei, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Thailand, Macao, South Korea, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Mongolia, and Timor-Leste

Source: Quah (2009b, p. 175).

The first pattern of corruption control is the least effective as the absence of an ACA in Japan has resulted in Global Integrity (2004) awarding a "very weak" score of 54 for Japan's integrity scorecard. Instead of initiating concerted action against the "structural aspects" of corruption in Japan, the Japanese government has adopted an incremental anti-corruption strategy by "haphazardly taking measures when scandals involving public officials or politicians emerged" (O'uchi *et al.*, 2006, p. 15). Bribery, breach of trust, tax evasion, securities exchange violations, and the circumvention of laws are viewed as crimes and investigated by the Special Investigation Departments (SIDs) in the public prosecutors' offices in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya. The Lockheed scandal of 1976 and the Recruit scandal of 1988 were investigated by the public prosecutors in Tokyo's SID (Tachi, 2002, p. 120). It is not surprising that there were 52 corruption scandals in Japan from 1948-2008 as there is no incentive for the "rotten triangle" of politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, who benefit from the structural corruption, to undermine the status quo and their predominance in the political system, especially when corrupt offenders are not always punished severely (Quah, 2011, pp. 44 and 72).

The third pattern of corruption control is more effective than the first two patterns if there is political will and a favourable policy context. This explains why Singapore and Hong Kong are the only two Asian countries among the 15 countries adopting pattern 3, which have been effective in curbing corruption. On the other hand, the other 13 Asian countries have failed to curb corruption effectively because of their lack of political will and unfavorable policy contexts.

ACAs constitute an important institutional pillar of a National Integrity System (Pope, 2000, pp. 36-37, 95-104). As "watchdog" agencies, ACAs are specialized agencies formed by governments for the specific purpose of minimizing corruption in their countries by focusing on the prevention, investigation and prosecution of corrupt offences, and the education of the public on the adverse consequences of corruption (Meagher, 2005, p. 70). Consequently, an ACA has these advantages over other less-specialized agencies established to deal with corruption: reduced administrative costs; reduced uncertainty over the jurisdiction by avoiding duplication of powers and work; a high degree of specialization and expertise; a high degree of autonomy; separateness from the agencies and departments that they will be investigating; considerable public credibility and profile; established security protection; political, legal and public accountability; clarity in the assessment of its progress, successes and failures; and swift action against corruption because task-specific resources are used and officials are not subjected to the competing priorities of general law enforcement, audit and similar agencies (Nicholls *et al.*, 2006, p. 476; and UNODC, 2004, pp. 89-90).

The second pattern of relying on multiple ACAs to curb corruption is less effective because the abovementioned advantages of an ACA are eroded by the competition and conflict between the multiple ACAs. The Philippines provides the best illustration of the ineffectiveness of multiple ACAs because it has relied on seven laws and 19 ACAs since the 1950s. It now relies on these five ACAs: the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), which is the lead ACA, the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG), the Inter-Agency Anti-Graft Coordinating Council (IACC), the Presidential Committee on

Effective Governance (PCEG) and the Governance Advisory Council (GAC) (Quah, 2011, pp. 26 and 151). Indeed, the reliance on multiple ACAs has not benefited the Philippines because the proliferation of these agencies has led to "resource and effort-dilution in the anti-corruption efforts due to duplication, layering and turf wars" (Quimson, 2006, p. 30). Furthermore, there is also no coordination or cooperation among the various ACAs, which compete for recognition, staff, and resources because they are understaffed and poorly funded. Even though their basic mandates are defined, these ACAs have overlapping jurisdiction, which diffuses anti-corruption efforts, and results in "poor coordination in policy and programme implementation, weak management and wastage of resources" (Oyamada, 2005, p. 99).

Similarly, in China, the many departments involved in anti-corruption work lack a proper coordination mechanism. Consequently, since 1993, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Supervision have enhanced cooperation among themselves. In the case of Vietnam, the National Anti-Corruption Steering Committee was formed in 2006 to coordinate the anti-corruption efforts of the six ACAs (Quah, 2007a, pp. 4-6).

In short, to combat corruption effectively, a government should establish a single ACA and provide it with sufficient manpower, budget, and autonomy to implement the anti-corruption laws effectively instead of relying on ineffective multiple ACAs.

Lesson 3: Do not Rely on the Police to Curb Corruption

Singapore was a British colony for nearly 140 years until it attained self-government in June 1959. As the British colonial government viewed corruption as a crime, it made the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in the Singapore Police Force (SPF) responsible for corruption control when the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) was enacted in December 1937. The British colonial government's decision to make the ACB responsible for corruption control in Singapore was a serious mistake for three reasons.

First, the ACB was a small unit of 17 men who were given a difficult task to perform: the eradication of corruption in the civil service in Singapore. Second, as the CID's top priority was to solve serious crimes like homicide, the task of fighting corruption received lower priority as the ACB had to compete with other branches in the CID for limited resources.

The third and most important reason for the ACB's ineffectiveness was the prevalence of police corruption in colonial Singapore. The Commissions of Inquiry of 1879 and 1886 found that police corruption was a serious problem in Singapore (Quah, 1979, pp. 24-26). However, the British colonial government ignored the findings of these two Commissions when it made the ACB responsible for curbing corruption in December 1937. The folly of making this decision was revealed in October 1951, when a consignment of 1,800 pounds of opium worth S\$400,000 (US\$133,333) was stolen by a gang of robbers, which included three police detectives. The British colonial government appointed a special team

led by a senior ACB officer to investigate the robbery. Investigations revealed that some senior police officers were also involved in the racket with both the hijackers and importers of the opium. The opium hijacking scandal made the British colonial government realize the importance of establishing an independent ACA that was separate from the police. Accordingly, it replaced the ACB with the CPIB in October 1952 (Quah, 2004, p. 1).

The same story applies to Hong Kong too, which was a British colony from 1841 until its handover to China on July 1, 1997. Like the ACB in Singapore, the ACB of the CID in the Royal Hong Kong Police Force (RHKPF) was also responsible for curbing corruption in Hong Kong from 1948 until 1971, when it was upgraded into the Anti-Corruption Office (ACO), which was also ineffective in dealing with the rampant police corruption. The escape of a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent Peter F. Godber, on June 8, 1973, to the United Kingdom angered the public and undermined the ACO's credibility. Consequently, Governor MacLehose was compelled by public criticism to accept the Blair Commission of Inquiry's recommendation to establish an independent ACA, separate from the RHKPF, to fight corruption. The ICAC was formed on February 15, 1974 (Quah, 2004, p. 1).

In sum, Singapore's breakthrough in its fight against corruption came with the British colonial government's realization that it had made a serious policy mistake in making the ACB responsible for curbing corruption when police corruption was rampant in Singapore. Similarly, the escape of Peter Godber on June 8, 1973, also made the British colonial government in Hong Kong realize that the ACO was ineffective in curbing police corruption and had to be replaced by the ICAC in February 1974. Thus, Singapore's and Hong Kong's success in combating corruption can be attributed to their rejection of the British colonial method of relying on the police to curb corruption and their reliance instead on the CPIB and ICAC, respectively. Singapore took 15 years (1937-1952) while Hong Kong took 26 years (1948-1974) to learn this important lesson. However, some countries like the United Kingdom and India have still not learnt this lesson as they continue to rely on police agencies such as the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) and the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), respectively, to curb corruption.

Lesson 4: Pay Civil Servants Adequate Salaries to Prevent Corruption

In his book, *The Russians*, Hedrick Smith (1976, pp. 116-117) recounted what a computer specialist told him:

No one can live on his regular pay. You know, in Odessa [Ukraine], they have a saying that if you get really mad at another person, you put a curse on him—let him live on his salary. It's a terrible fate. No one can imagine it.

In his comparative study of the control of bureaucratic corruption in Hong Kong, India and Indonesia, Leslie Palmier (1985, p. 2) has identified low salary as one of the three causes of corruption: "If the official is not to be tempted into corruption and disaffection, clearly there is an obligation on the government to provide or at least allow such benefits as will ensure his loyalty; one might call it an implicit contract."

Consequently, Palmier (1985, p. 6) contends that "adequate pay" is "an essential ingredient in reform." In the same vein, Paulo Mauro (1997, p. 5) has argued that "when civil service pay is too low, civil servants may be obliged to use their positions to collect bribes as a way of making ends meet, particularly when the expected cost of being caught is low."

Civil servants and political leaders are more vulnerable to corruption if their salaries are meager or not commensurate with their positions and responsibilities. It is unrealistic to expect them to remain honest if they are paid low salaries which are inadequate for meeting their daily needs. Indeed, the low salaries of civil servants and political leaders constitute an important cause of the corruption in many Asian countries. For example, Theodore M. Smith (1971, pp. 28-29) found that in Indonesia, "there is not a single official who can live by his government income alone" because the "official income amounts to approximately half of [his] essential monthly needs." Similarly, Stephanie McPhail (1995, p. 45) reported that in the Mongolian countryside, "one out of three judges does not have an apartment. Consequently, some judges live in their office, which is clearly not desirable and does not enhance the status of the judiciary." Civil servants in the Philippines describe their low salaries as "starvation wages" that are inadequate to meet the daily needs of their families. As the salaries of South Korean civil servants are equivalent to 70 per cent of private sector wages, some scholars have recommended that bureaucratic corruption can be reduced by increasing the salaries of civil servants (Quah, 2011, p. 465).

Table 8: Salaries of Political Leaders in 11 Asian Countries, 2010

Country	Annual Basic Salary (US Dollar)	Rank
Singapore	2,183,516	1
Hong Kong SAR	513,245	2
Japan	273,676	3
Taiwan	184,200	4
South Korea	136,669	5
Indonesia	124,171	6
Thailand	32,200	7
Philippines	24,000	8
China	10,663	9
Mongolia	9,132	10
India	4,106	11

Sources: *Economist* (2010); Backman (2004, p. 27) for the salaries of the Thai Prime Minister and the Philippines President; and the IAAC for the Mongolian President's salary.

Table 8 shows that the annual basic salaries of Singapore's Prime Minister and Hong Kong's Chief Executive are among the highest in the world. On the other hand, the annual basic salaries of the political leaders in Thailand, Philippines, China, Mongolia and India are very low, with India's Prime Minister being among the poorest paid political leaders in the world with an annual basic salary of US\$4,106 in 2010.

Accordingly, political leaders and civil servants in Asian countries should be paid decent salaries instead of "starvation wages" to insulate them from bribery and patronage. However, three qualifications must be made. First, as increasing salaries is

expensive, only countries that have sustained economic growth can afford to do so. In Singapore's case, the People's Action Party (PAP) government could not afford to raise the salaries of the political leaders and civil servants from June 1959 to February 1972. Hence, the focus of Singapore's anti-corruption strategy during this period was the impartial enforcement of the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) by the CPIB.

Singapore's experience shows that it is possible to curb corruption by impartially enforcing the anti-corruption laws without raising the salaries of the civil servants and politicians. The salaries of the latter were increased from March 1972 onwards to prevent the brain drain of talented civil servants to the private sector, rather than as a mechanism to curb corruption. However, the PAP leaders have stressed the need to pay the senior bureaucrats and ministers competitive salaries to attract the "best and brightest" and to keep those who have been attracted to the Singapore Civil Service and the government, honest and incorruptible.

The second qualification is that increasing salaries minimizes petty corruption by reducing the incentive for corruption among junior officials but does not eliminate grand corruption among the senior civil servants and politicians. In other words, salary revision is ineffective in curbing grand corruption, which is motivated by greed and not need, when it is prevalent among the political leaders and senior bureaucrats.

Finally, raising salaries alone is ineffective in solving the problem of corruption if the incumbent government lacks the political will to do so, if the ACA or ACAs are ineffective, if corrupt officials are not punished, and if opportunities for corruption are not reduced in vulnerable public agencies. Thus, salary revision is a necessary but insufficient condition for curbing corruption if other reforms are not undertaken also (Quah, 2007b, pp. 42-43).

Lesson 5: Enforce the Anti-Corruption Laws Impartially, not Selectively

To combat corruption effectively, the anti-corruption laws in a country must be enforced by the ACA impartially as those found guilty of corruption offences must be punished, regardless of their status or position. If the "big fish" (rich and famous) are protected and not prosecuted for their corrupt offences, the credibility and efficacy of the country's anti-corruption strategy will be undermined. In other words, corrupt individuals should be punished according to the law, regardless of whether they are "big fish" or "small fish." Furthermore, rich and powerful individuals should not be immune from investigation and prosecution for corruption offences.

A major reason for the rampant corruption in the Philippines is the lack of impartial enforcement of the anti-corruption laws. Eufemio Domingo, who was appointed by President Fidel Ramos to chair the Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), lamented after three years on the job, that "the system is not working" because the many anti-corruption laws, rules and regulations are "not being faithfully implemented" (quoted in Balgos, 1998, pp. 267-268). Similarly, Edna Co *et al.* (2007, p. 11) have attributed the Philippines' ineffectiveness in curbing corruption to the

lack of enforcement of the numerous anti-corruption laws and policies.

On September 11, 2007, former President Joseph Estrada was found guilty by the *Sandiganbayan* (Anti-Graft Court) of receiving payoffs and kickbacks before his ouster from office and sentenced to a maximum of 40 years imprisonment (Conde, 2007, p. 3). On October 25, 2007, President Arroyo pardoned Estrada six weeks after his conviction even though anti-corruption advocates and state prosecutors have urged her not to do so (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 2007). Arroyo's pardon of Estrada was criticized by the *Economist* (2007) because it renews "concerns in many quarters that the rich and powerful remain immune from punishment" and fails "to dispel concerns about entrenched corruption in the Philippines."

In contrast, Singapore's success in combating corruption can be attributed to the CPIB's adoption of a "total approach to enforcement" by dealing with both "big and small cases" of public and private sector corruption, "both giver and receiver of bribes" and "other crimes uncovered in the course of [the] corruption investigation" (Soh, 2008, pp. 1-2). According to Soh Kee Hean (2008, pp. 2-3), a former CPIB Director, the CPIB has succeeded in its enforcement efforts because of its reliance on skilful interview techniques, careful planning and execution of field operations, and computer forensics. Indeed, the CPIB's effective enforcement capacity is the result of its threefold emphasis on the capability building of its enforcement officers, building networks and partnerships with other public agencies in Singapore, and organizational excellence.

Furthermore, unlike the OMB in the Philippines, the CPIB has enforced the POCA impartially by not hesitating to investigate allegations of corruption against political leaders and senior civil servants in Singapore. The CPIB has investigated these four PAP leaders for corruption: (1) Tan Kia Gan, the Minister for National Development, in 1966 for assisting his friend in the sale of Boeing aircraft to Malaysian Airways; (2) Wee Toon Boon, Minister of State, in 1975 for accepting bribes from a property developer; (3) Phey Yew Kok, a Member of Parliament (MP) and trade union leader, in 1979 for criminal breach of trust; and (4) Teh Cheang Wan, Minister for National Development, in 1986 for accepting bribes of S\$1 million from two property developers. Tan was stripped of all his public appointments as the witnesses did not give evidence against him. Wee was found guilty and sentenced to four and a half years of imprisonment. Phey jumped bail and fled abroad and remains a fugitive. Teh committed suicide before he could be charged in court (CPIB, 2003, pp. 6.45-6.47).

Similarly, the CPIB has also investigated Glenn Knight, Director of the Commercial Affairs Department, and he was sentenced to three months' jail in October 1991 for attempted cheating and giving false information to obtain a government car loan. In 1993, Yeo Seng Teck, the Chief Executive Officer of the Trade Development Board, was investigated for cheating offences and charged for 22 counts of forgery, cheating, and using forged invoices involving the purchases of Chinese antiques worth S\$2 million. Yeo was found guilty and sentenced to four years imprisonment. In 1995, Choy Hon Tim, the Deputy Chief Executive (Operations) of the Public Utilities Board, was investigated for receiving kickbacks from some contractors. He was convicted for

receiving bribes amounting to S\$13.85 million and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment (CPIB, 2003, pp. 6.48-6.49).

On December 19, 2011, Ng Boon Gay, the Director of the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB), was arrested by the CPIB for "serious personal conduct" and was charged on June 12, 2012 with four counts of corruptly obtaining sexual favours from a former information technology (IT) sales manager, Cecilia Sue. Ng's trial began on September 25, 2012 and he was acquitted on February 14, 2013 by District Judge Siva Shanmugam because there was no evidence to show that Ng was aware that Cecilia Sue's employer, Hitachi Data Systems, was involved in a contract that he had approved as the CNB's Director (Tham and Lim, 2013, p. A1). The second recent high profile case was the arrest by the CPIB of Peter Lim, the Director of the Singapore Civil Defence Force, on January 4, 2012, and he was charged on June 6, 2012 on 10 counts of corruption involving sex with three female IT executives, who were seeking government contracts for their companies (Lim and Tham, 2012, p. A1). Lim's trial began on February 18, 2013 and is expected to continue for several weeks.

At the CPIB's 60th anniversary celebrations in Singapore on September 18, 2012, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong contended that "incorruptibility has become ingrained in the Singaporean psyche and culture" because of the CPIB's impartiality in enforcing the anti-corruption laws, its thorough and efficient investigation of corruption cases, and the punishment of those found guilty of corruption offences (Lee, 2012, p. A23).

Lesson 6: Do not Use Corruption as a Weapon against Political Opponents

As an ACA is a powerful agency, its powers should not be abused by the government or political leaders by using corruption as a weapon against their political opponents. However, in reality, many corrupt political leaders have frequently employed corruption as a weapon against their political rivals. In her review of the corruption situation in Southeast Asia for Transparency International's *Global Corruption Report 2001*, Dini Djalal (2001, pp. 32-33) has observed that "the tendency to use corruption charges to settle political scores is widespread" as such charges are "increasingly used as a means to discredit rivals, rather than as an effort to clean up politics" in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.

In Cambodia, Prime Minister Hun Sen used the campaign against illegal logging to remove those military officers who posed a threat to him. In Indonesia, President Abdurrahman Wahid's allies initiated corruption investigations against those opposition legislators who had targeted Wahid. In Malaysia, corruption charges were used to silence the opposition leader and former deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim. In Vietnam, the Communist Party relied on its three-year-old "self-criticism" campaign to "lick official boots and kick their colleagues" and to enable the "conservatives to weed out the reformers" (Djalal, 2001, p. 32).

In China, anti-corruption campaigns have been used to "bring down the opposing forces" as illustrated in the sentencing of the former Beijing party chief, Chen Xitong,

to 16 years imprisonment for graft of 555,000 Yuan and dereliction of duty on July 31, 1998. Chen's sentence was lenient as more junior party cadres were given life imprisonment or the death penalty for corruption involving smaller sums exceeding 100,000 Yuan. Nevertheless, his imprisonment on corruption charges has been viewed as a successful attempt by his political foes to undermine his power as more than 170 corrupt senior party officials have been protected from criminal punishment (Zou, 2003, p. 86; Quah, 2011, p. 19). Furthermore, it was earlier reported that Chen Xitong's prosecution was delayed because the CCP was afraid that he would "expose in public the identity of other high-ranking corrupt officials" if he had to appear in court (Lo, 1999, p. 59).

Referring to the arrests of the Shanghai party chief and two members of the CCP's Political Bureau on corruption charges in the fall of 2006, and the removal from office of the mayors of Shenzhen and Chongqing in 2009, John Bryan Starr (2010, pp. 80-81) noted that "anti-corruption campaigns often have as much to do with settling intra-party rivalries as they do with reasserting public probity."

The most recent illustration of the reliance on corruption as a political weapon by China's political leaders was the sacking and detention of Bo Xilai, Chongqing's party chief, on March 15, 2012. He was suspended on the evening of April 10, 2012 from his Politburo and Central Committee positions for "serious" but unspecified violations of party discipline (Garnaut, 2012, pp. 120-124). According to John Garnaut (2012, pp. 18 and 129-130), the China correspondent for the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Age*:

The political explosion of Bo Xilai is blowing open the black box of Chinese politics and laying bare a world of staggering brutality, corruption, hypocrisy and fragility. ... The demise of Bo Xilai has opened cleavages in the Party along factional, ideological and personal lines. ... Destroying Bo would give Xi [Jinping] a weapon with which he could taint Bo's associates and accelerate the consolidation of his power.

Similarly, Professor Steve Tsang, Director of Nottingham University's China Policy Institute, claims that the Bo Xilai scandal is "a political rather than a legal case." Professor Willy Lam of the Chinese University of Hong Kong has emphasized the importance of the CCP's dominant faction to control the judicial apparatus so that "it's then easy to use the law to attack your opponents." Bo Xilai's downfall as a victim of the factional in-fighting within the CCP in the lead-up to the 18th Party Congress in November 2012 reminded Willy Lam of the "old-style back-stabbing under Mao Zedong" (Bristow, 2012).

The establishment of an ACA sends a powerful signal to the citizens in a country that their government is committed to fighting corruption (UNODC, 2004, p. 90). However, the reliance on an ACA to combat corruption is a double-edged sword because it can be used by the incumbent government for good or for evil. In the hands of a clean government, the ACA can be an asset and a powerful weapon against corrupt politicians, civil servants and business persons. Conversely, a corrupt government will

make a mockery of its anti-corruption strategy by using the ACA to victimize its political foes instead (Quah, 2010, p. 51).

Lesson 7: Punish Corrupt Offenders Severely to Deter Corruption

As corruption is a crime, the most effective way to curb it is to punish those found guilty of corrupt offences. However, in reality, the probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offences varies in the different Asian countries.

In Asian countries afflicted with rampant corruption, corruption is viewed as a "low risk, high reward" activity as the probability of being detected and punished for corrupt offences is low because of the ineffective anti-corruption measures and weak political will. For example, Thais tolerate corruption and do not view it as being harmful to the public interest as no one is hurt by it. More specifically, they have identified seven levels of corruption, ranging from the less severe form of misconduct, *sin nam jai* (gift of goodwill), to the most severe form of misconduct, *kan khorrapchuan* (corruption). The first three levels are viewed as acceptable practices, with the remaining four levels considered as unacceptable ones. Furthermore, apart from tolerating corruption, many Thais are embarrassed if prominent individuals are humiliated. This explains why unsuccessful coup leaders are usually ignored and not punished for their illegal actions (Quah, 2011, pp. 290-292).

In South Korea, those found guilty of corrupt offences are not punished severely as they are usually pardoned by the President before the completion of their prison terms. The most recent example of this practice is the special pardon granted by President Lee Myung-bak on January 29, 2013, to 55 persons who were imprisoned for bribery. Among those pardoned were Lee's confidant and former minister, Choi See-joong; his friend and businessman, Chun Shin-il; former parliamentary speaker, Park Hee-tae; and Lee's former senior political affairs aide. This latest round was the seventh time that President Lee had exercised his right to pardon those found guilty of corrupt offences during his five-year term of office (*Straits Times*, 2013, p. A12). Yoon Gwan-seok, spokesperson for the Democratic United Party, criticized President Lee's action because "using pardons to let off friends and family at the end of one's presidency is more than shameless it is a deliberate insult to the Korean people" (Ahn, 2013).

On the other hand, corruption is not a serious problem in Singapore and Hong Kong where corruption is perceived as a "high risk, low reward" activity because those involved in corrupt activities are likely to be caught and severely punished. Singapore's experience demonstrates the importance of punishing corrupt offenders, regardless of their status or position, in order to deter others from being involved in corruption. During the British colonial period, corruption was perceived by the population as a "low risk, high reward" activity as the probability of being detected and punished for corrupt offences was low because of the ineffectiveness of the ACB. However, the empowerment of the CPIB by the enactment of the POCA in June 1960 by the PAP government, which was committed to eradicating corruption, led to the transformation of the public perception of corruption in Singapore to a "high risk, low reward" activity.

The POCA's deterrent effect was enhanced by increasing the penalty for corrupt offences to imprisonment for five years and/or a fine of S\$10,000. In 1981, the POCA was amended to increase its deterrent effect by requiring those convicted of corruption to repay all the money received in addition to facing the usual court sentence (section 13). Offenders who could not make full restitution were given heavier court sentences. In 1989, the fine for corrupt offences was further increased by 10 times from S\$10,000 to S\$100,000 to further enhance the POCA's deterrent effect. Sections 11 and 12 further stipulate that Members of Parliament and members of public bodies found guilty of corrupt offences would be fined S\$100,000 and imprisoned for a term of seven years (Quah, 2011, pp. 219-221).

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the impact of punishment as a deterrent to corrupt behavior is to refer to a comparative analysis of successful prosecution of corrupt offenders in Hong Kong and the Philippines in 1997. Robert Beschel, Jr., (1999, p. 8) found that a person committing a corrupt offence in Hong Kong was 35 times more likely to be detected and punished than his counterpart in the Philippines. The more effective detection and punishment of corrupt individuals in Hong Kong is an important factor why corruption is a less serious problem in Hong Kong than in the Philippines. In his memoirs, the former Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew (2000, p. 342) has attributed the lack of punishment against President Marcos, his family, and cronies for their corrupt activities to the "soft, forgiving culture" of the Philippines.

Thus, to minimize corruption and to deter those who are not involved in corrupt practices from doing so, honesty and incorruptibility among civil servants and political leaders must be recognized and rewarded instead of being punished. The lack of punishment of corrupt civil servants and political leaders in a country sends the wrong signal to their honest counterparts and the population at large because it makes a mockery of the anti-corruption laws and encourages others to become corrupt as the probability of being caught and punished is low. In other words, the political system in a country plagued with corruption rewards those who are corrupt and punishes those who are honest. Needless to say, this system of reward and punishment must be reversed by punishing the corrupt offenders and rewarding those who have abstained from being corrupt (Quah, 2007b, p. 45).

Edward Banfield (1975, p. 605) concluded his article on "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization" by highlighting the adverse consequences of a society that promotes dishonesty thus:

In a society in which *dishonesty* is the best policy, will not the individual feel contempt for himself and for his fellows and will he not conclude—rightly perhaps—that he and they are "not worth saving"?

Conclusion

The difficult task of eliminating corruption has been highlighted by Christian Gobel (2004), who has described the tasks of combating political corruption, organized

crime or *heijin* ("black gold"), and vote-buying in Taiwan as "beheading the Hydra," the Greek mythical creature with several heads that grew again when cut off. More recently, Laurence Cockcroft (2012, pp. 231-232) has emphasized the need for a sustained campaign against corruption to assure victory because corruption is like "a snake which will frequently respond with poison, and will only die with repeated attack" and "only if severed at the head."

Why is it so difficult to eliminate corruption? Corruption is a formidable foe to defeat because corrupt individuals are highly intelligent and capable of finding legal loopholes or other methods to circumvent the anti-corruption laws. For example, Bernard Madoff was "smart, savvy, and experienced at bucking the system" (Sander, 2009, p. 223).

Furthermore, as they have a great deal to lose if they are detected and caught, corrupt persons have developed many safeguards and defence mechanisms to avoid detection, investigation, arrest and prosecution. Alexandra Wrage (2013) has recently described "five schemes for creative corruption" which corrupt individuals have devised to circumvent sophisticated internal controls in a company. Consequently, as corrupt operators today show considerable ingenuity, she advises that those persons responsible for combating corruption in both public and private organizations must also show considerable sophistication and "think like a criminal to stay ahead of the bad guys."

Thus, to combat corruption effectively, those Asian countries which are plagued with rampant corruption can enhance their anti-corruption efforts by applying the seven lessons highlighted above, assuming that their political leaders and citizens have the political will to do so. Failure to do so, however, will mean that the political leaders of these Asian countries will continue to pursue "hopeless" anti-corruption strategies that will perpetuate corruption instead of stifling it (Quah, 2006, p. 179). Indeed, when corruption becomes a way of life in a country, "predatory, value-destroying behavior" becomes "systematically more profitable than honest, productive work" and its citizens "would not enjoy living in a society dominated by cynicism and dishonesty" (Ferguson, 2012, p. 324).

References

- Ahn, C.H. (2013). "President Lee's corrupt relatives and associates could be pardoned." *Hankyoreh*, January 10.
- Backman, M. (2004). *The Asian Insider: Unconventional Wisdom for Asian Business*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Chapter 4, "Paying Peanuts: Politicians' Pay in Asia," pp. 25-29.
- Balgos, C.C.A. (1998). "Ombudsman." In S.S. Coronel (ed.), *Pork and Other Perks: Corruption and Governance in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Center for Investigative Journalism, pp. 244-271.
- Banfield, E.C. (1975). "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization." *Journal of Law and Economics*, 18 (3) (December): 587-605.
- Beschel, R.P. Jr. (1999). *Corruption, Transparency and Accountability in the Philippines*. Manila: Unpublished report prepared for the Asian Development Bank.
- Bristow, M. (2012). "China scandal: Is Bo Xilai victim of political dispute?" *BBC News China*, April 17. Available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-17738723>

- Co, E.E.A., Lim, M., Lao, M.E.J., and Juan, L.J. (2007). *Minimizing Corruption: Philippine Democracy Assessment*. Pasig City: Friedrich Egbert Stiftung Philippine Office.
- Cockcroft, L. (2012). *Global Corruption: Money, Power and Ethics in the Modern World*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Conde, C.H. (2007). "Pardoning Estrada could benefit Arroyo." *International Herald Tribune*, September 25.
- CPIB (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau). (2003). *Swift and Sure Action: Four Decades of Anti-Corruption Work*. Singapore.
- Deutsche Presse-Agentur. (2007). "Philippine leader grants clemency to Estrada." October 25.
- Djalal, D. (2001). "Southeast Asia." In R. Hodess, J. Banfield and T. Wolfe (eds.), *Global Corruption Report 2001*. Berlin: Transparency International, pp. 23-38.
- Economist*. (2007). "Pardon in the Philippines: The current president controversially pardons a former one." October 30.
- Economist*. (2010). "Politicians' Salaries: Leaders of the Fee World." July 5.
- Ferguson, C. (2012). *Predator Nation: Corporate Criminals, Political Corruption and the Hijacking of America*. New York: Crown Business.
- Garnaut, J. (2012). *The Rise and Fall of the House of Bo*. Melbourne: Penguin Group (Australia).
- Global Integrity. (2004). "Japan's Integrity Scorecard." Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.globalintegrity.org/2004/scores.aspx?cc=jp&act=scores>.
- Gobel, C. (2004). "Beheading the Hydra: Combating Political Corruption and Organized Crime." *China Perspectives*, 56 (November-December): 1-17.
- Kpundeh, S.J. (1998). "Political Will in Fighting Corruption." In: S.J. Kpundeh and I. Hors (eds.), *Corruption and Integrity Improvement Initiatives in Developing Countries*. New York: United Nations Development Programme, Chapter 6, pp. 91-110.
- Lee, H.L. (2012). "Incorruptibility ingrained in S'porean psyche." *Straits Times*, September 19.
- Lee, K.Y. (2000). *From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*. Singapore: Times Media.
- Lim, L. and Tham, Y.C. (2012). "Former SCDF chief faces 10 charges." *Straits Times*, June 7.
- Lo, S.S.H. (1999). "Public Maladministration and Bureaucratic Corruption." In D.C.B. Teather and H.S. Yee (eds.), *China in Transition: Issues and Policies*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, Chapter 3, pp. 47-68.
- Mauro, P. (1997). *Why Worry about Corruption?* Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.
- McPhail, S. (1995). *Developing Mongolia's Legal Framework: A Needs Analysis*. Manila: Asian Development Bank.
- Meagher, P. (2005). "Anti-Corruption Agencies: Rhetoric versus Reality." *Journal of Policy Reform*, 8 (1): 69-103.
- Myrdal, G. (1970). "Corruption as a Hindrance to Modernization in South Asia." In: A.J. Heidenheimer (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, Chapter 22, pp. 229-239.
- Nicholls, C., Daniel, T., Polaine, M. and Hatchard, J. (2006). *Corruption and Misuse of Public Office*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- O'uchi, M., Ishii, Y., Konishi, A., Kuroda, T., Sugawara, S., Umeda, T., and Yamazaki, K. (2006). *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Japan 2006*. Berlin: Transparency International.
- Oyamada, E. (2005). "President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's Anti-Corruption Strategy in the Philippines: An Evaluation." *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 13 (1) (June): 81-107.
- Palmier, L. (1985). *The Control of Bureaucratic Corruption: Case Studies in Asia*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers.
- PERC (Political and Economic Risk Consultancy). (2012). "Regional Overview." *Asian Intelligence*, 847 (March 21): 1-4.
- Pope, J. (2000). *Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System*. Berlin: Transparency International.
- Quah, J.S.T. (1979). "Police Corruption in Singapore: An Analysis of Its Forms, Extent and Causes." *Singapore Police Journal*, 10 (1) (January): 7-43.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2004). "Best Practices for Curbing Corruption in Asia." *Governance Brief*, Issue 11, pp. 1-4.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2006). "Curbing Asian Corruption: An Impossible Dream?" *Current History*, 105 (690) (April): 176-179.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2007a). *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Regional Overview Report: Asia 2006*. Berlin: Transparency International.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2007b). *Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Countries*. Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2009a). "Combating Corruption in the Asia-Pacific Countries: What do we know and What needs to be done?" In: C. Wescott, B. Bowornwathana, and L.R. Jones (eds.), *The Many Faces of Public Management Reform in the Asia-Pacific Region*. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, Chapter 2, pp. 15-43.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2009b). "Benchmarking for Excellence: A Comparative Analysis of Seven Asian Anti-Corruption Agencies." *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration*, 31 (2): 171-195.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2010). "Defying Institutional Failure: Learning from the Experiences of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Four Asian Countries." *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 53 (1): 23-54.
- Quah, J.S.T. (2011). *Curbing Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream?* Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing.
- Quimson, G. (2006). *National Integrity Systems Transparency International Country Study Report: Philippines 2006*. Berlin: Transparency International.
- Sander, P. (2009). *Madoff: Corruption, Deceit, and the Making of the World's most Notorious Ponzi Scheme*. Guilford: Lyons Press.
- Schwab, K. (ed.) (2012). *The Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013*. Geneva: World Economic Forum.
- Senior, I. (2006). *Corruption the World's Big C: Cases, Causes, Consequences, Cures*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Smith, H. (1976). *The Russians*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Smith, T.M. (1971). "Corruption, Tradition and Change." *Indonesia*, 11 (April): 21-40.
- Soh, K.H. (2008). "Corruption Enforcement." Paper presented at the Second Seminar of the International Association of Anti-Corruption Associations in Chongqing, China, May 17-18.
- Starr, J.B. (2010). *Understanding China: A Guide to China's Economy, History, and Political Culture*. 3rd edition. New York: Hill and Wang.
- Straits Times*. (2013). "South Korean leader pardons ex-aides." January 30.
- Tachi, Y. (2002). "Role of Public Prosecutors in Japan," in Asian Development Bank, *Taking Action Corruption in Asia and the Pacific*. Manila.
- Tham, Y.C. and Lim, J. (2013). "Court finds Ng Boon Gay not guilty of corruption." *Straits Times*, February 15.
- UNODC (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime). (2004). *The Global Programme Against Corruption: United Nations Anti-Corruption Toolkit*, 3rd edition. Vienna.
- World Bank. (2012). *Doing Business 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World*. Washington, D.C.
- Wrage, A. (2013). "Five Schemes for Creative Corruption." *Forbes*, March 12, available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrawrage/2013/03/12/five-schemes-for-creative-corruption/>
- Zou, K. (2003). "Why China's Rampant Corruption cannot be Checked by Laws alone." In G. Wang and Y. Zheng (eds.), *Damage Control: The Chinese Communist Party in the Jiang Zemin Era*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, Chapter 3, pp. 81-97.