

The Critical Importance of Political Will in Combating Corruption in Asian Countries

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Abstract

Political will is the most important factor responsible for the success of Singapore and Hong Kong in combating corruption among Asian countries. This article adopts Derick Brinkerhoff's definition of political will and identifies its five indicators. It explains why political will is necessary for effective corruption control and recommends six strategies for developing the political will required for curbing corruption effectively in the Asian countries. It concludes that countries with good governance and strong political will are less corrupt than those countries with poor governance and weak political will.

Keywords: Anti-Corruption Agencies, China, corruption, political will

Introduction

Corruption remains a serious problem in many Asian countries in spite of the many anti-corruption measures introduced during the past six decades. In my analysis of the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures in ten Asian countries, I found that political will is the critical factor responsible for the success of Singapore and Hong Kong in curbing corruption (Quah, 2011, p.456). What is political will? Why is political will needed for ensuring effective corruption control? How can those Asian countries afflicted with rampant corruption nurture the political will needed to minimize corruption? These three questions will be addressed in turn in this article.

What is Political Will?

Political will has been defined in various ways by many scholars. In reviewing the literature on the definitions on political will, Lori Ann Post, Amber Raile and Eric Raile (2010, pp. 657-658) conclude that political will is "a complex, multifaceted concept" which focuses on these three aspects: (1) the "distribution of preferences with regard to the outcome of interest"; (2) the "authority, capacity, and legitimacy of key decision makers or reformers"; and (3) the "commitment to preferences." Building on previous definitions, they define political will as "the extent of committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a particular problem." This definition is useful because it dissects the concept of political will into these four components: (1) a sufficient set of decision makers; (2) with a common understanding of a particular problem on the formal agenda; (3) is committed to supporting; and (4) a commonly

perceived, potentially effective policy solution (Post, Raile and Raile, 2010, p. 659).

Unlike the general definition provided by Post, Raile and Raile, Sahr J. Kpundeh (1998, p. 92) has defined "political will" as "the demonstrated credible intent of political actors (elected or appointed leaders, civil society watchdogs, stakeholder groups, etc.) to attack perceived causes or effects of corruption at a systemic level." However, a more useful definition is provided by Derick W. Brinkerhoff (2000, p. 242) who defines political will as "the commitment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives - in this case, anti-corruption policies and programmes - and to sustain the costs of those actions over time." Elected or appointed leaders and public agency senior officials are expected by their citizens to manifest political will in combating corruption.

There are five indicators of political will. First, there must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation. Second, the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) must be provided with adequate personnel, budget, and equipment as well as operational autonomy to enable them to perform their functions effectively. Third, the anti-corruption laws must be enforced impartially, regardless of the offender's position, status, or political affiliation, and without political interference. Fourth, political will exists when the government avoids the use of corruption as a weapon against its political opponents. Fifth, anti-corruption efforts must be sustained and their impact must be monitored by the government.

Political Will and Effective Corruption Control

Political will is needed for effective corruption control for three reasons. The first reason is that combating corruption is expensive as the ACAs need sufficient personnel, budget and equipment to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. Indeed, without political will, the ACAs will not be provided with the required personnel, budget and equipment because "the principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they wish to do so are politicians" as they "make the laws and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced" (Senior, 2006, pp. 184, 187).

Table 1: Per Capita Expenditure of Nine Anti-Corruption Agencies in 2008

Anti-Corruption Agency	Budget	Population	Per Capita Expenditure	Rank
ICAC Hong Kong	US\$97.7 m	7.3 m	US\$13.40	1 st
CPIB Singapore	US\$11.2 m	4.8 m	US\$2.32	2 nd
ACRC South Korea	US\$61.0 m	48.4 m	US\$1.26	3 rd
IAAC Mongolia	US\$3.1 m	2.7 m	US\$1.15	4 th
NACC Thailand	US\$21.3 m	64.3 m	US\$0.33	5 th
OMB Philippines	US\$19.6 m	89.7 m	US\$0.22	6 th
MJIB Taiwan	US\$4.0 m	22.9 m	US\$0.18	7 th
KPK Indonesia	US\$31.8 m	234.3 m	US\$0.14	8 th
CBI India	US\$52.1 m	1,186.2 m	US\$0.04	9 th

Source: Quah (2011, p. 455, Table 12.9).

Perhaps the most important indicator of a government's political will is the budget allocated by it to the ACA for performing its anti-corruption functions. The different levels of political will in combating corruption in nine Asian countries are reflected in the per capita expenditure of their ACAs. Table 1 shows that Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) has the highest per capita expenditure of US\$13.40, followed by Singapore's Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) (US\$2.32), South Korea's Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) (US\$1.26), Mongolia's Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC) (US\$1.15), Thailand's National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) (US\$0.33), Philippines' Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) (US\$0.22), Taiwan's Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau (MJIB) (US\$0.18), Indonesia's *Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi* (KPK or Corruption Eradication Commission) (US\$0.14) and India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) (US\$0.04). Consequently, it is not surprising that Singapore and Hong Kong have succeeded in curbing corruption because of the strong political will of their governments as manifested in the high per capita expenditure of their ACAs.

The second reason why political will is needed for curbing corruption effectively is that corrupt individuals and organizations are powerful and have vested interests to circumvent the anti-corruption laws to avoid arrest and conviction for their offences. Hence, governments must provide the ACAs with adequate resources and operational autonomy to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially and effectively. Corruption is a formidable foe to defeat because corrupt individuals are highly intelligent and capable of finding legal loopholes or other methods to circumvent the anti-corruption laws. For example, Bernard Madoff was "smart, savvy, and experienced at bucking the system" (Sander, 2009, p. 223). Similarly, according to James McGregor (2012, p. 112) those persons who became rich during China's years of development "often through political connections and corruption" are "usually the major roadblock to reform" because "reforms threaten their financial fortunes, and leave them vulnerable politically, just as the middle class gains power and pushes for transparency and rule of law."

Thirdly, fighting corruption is a difficult and complex task because it is necessary to identify the causes of corruption and to recommend appropriate measures to address these causes over a sustained period of time. Often, governments fail to conduct this analysis. Christian Gobel (2004) has described the difficult tasks of combating political corruption, organized crime, and vote-buying in Taiwan as "beheading the Hydra," the Greek mythical creature with several heads that grew again when cut off. In the same vein, Laurence Cockcroft (2012, pp. 231-232) has described corruption as "a snake which will frequently respond with poison, and will only die with repeated attack" and "only if severed at the head."

Strategies for Nurturing Political Will

In a recent interview, Bertrand de Speville (2013, p. 19), a former ICAC Commissioner in Hong Kong, has aptly described the fragility of political will by

referring to it as "a candle flame" which can be easily "extinguished by any passing political breeze." Political will is needed not only to initiate comprehensive anti-corruption measures to address the causes of corruption, but also to sustain the impartial implementation of these measures over a long period of time.

Political will can be generated from the top down by the government and public agencies and/or from the bottom up by civil society organizations (CSOs) and the mass media. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2008, pp. 152-155) has recommended a seven-point agenda for action to combat corruption in the Asia Pacific countries, which includes a two-pronged approach that combines "both top-down and bottom-up anti-corruption efforts to ensure that political will is present to keep governments and citizens 'clean'" (Rajivan and Gampart, 2009, p. 755). There are six strategies for nurturing political will to curb corruption in Asian countries.

1. Elect competent and honest persons to political office.

This first strategy is important but difficult to implement in many Asian countries because of two obstacles. The first obstacle is the criminalization of politics in some Asian countries, which enable criminals to compete in elections. In India, 120 (22 per cent) of the 543 Members of Parliament elected in 2004 had criminal cases involving murder, robbery and rape against them (Chishti, 2009, p. xv). In Taiwan, it was estimated in 1995 that 37.8 per cent of town representatives had organized crime backgrounds, followed by 26.5 per cent of county and city councillors, and 3 per cent of the national representatives (Quah, 2011, p. 169). Kevin Casas-Zamora (2013, pp. 7-8) explains why the connection between organized crime and political finance is important thus:

The capture of parties and elected officials by moneyed interests is bad news for democracy in the best of cases. ... The capture of parties, leaders, and institutions by the perpetrators of illicit activities has one overarching goal: the hollowing out of the rule of law. ... Organized crime normally seeks to prevent the law from being enforced altogether. Moreover, it does so by resorting to violence if necessary.

The second obstacle encountered is the prevalence of vote-buying in some Asian countries which means that only those candidates with financial resources or sponsors can afford to compete for public office through elections. In India, it is "impossible to run an election campaign without illicit funds" because candidates in the 2009 general election were estimated to have spent US\$2 million to US\$3 million each even though each candidate was allowed to spend only US\$55,000 (French, 2013, p. 70). In Taiwan, the MJIB investigated 2,327 vote-buying cases from 1993-2009. In November 2001, 3,509 vote captains, who were arrested for bribery cases, were linked to the December 2001 legislative election (Quah, 2011, p. 168). In Thailand, 30 million baht were spent on buying votes in the 1996 election. The candidates in the 2001 election spent 30 billion baht (US\$75 million) (Quah, 2011, p. 292).

Table 2: Public Trust in Politicians and Corruption Perceptions Index Scores of 22 Asian Countries in 2014

Country	Public Trust in Politicians Rank & Score (N=144)	Corruption Perceptions Index Rank & Score (N=175)
Singapore	1 st (6.2)	7 th (84)
Hong Kong	18 th (4.6)	17 th (74)
Malaysia	17 th (4.7)	50 th (52)
Lao PDR	29 nd (3.9)	145 th (25)
Bhutan	24 th (4.1)	30 th (65)
Taiwan	30 th (3.9)	35 th (61)
China	26 th (4.1)	100 th (36)
Japan	21 st (4.5)	15 th (76)
Vietnam	49 th (3.4)	119 th (31)
Indonesia	37 th (3.6)	107 th (34)
Timor-Leste	75 th (3.0)	133 rd (28)
Cambodia	91 st (2.6)	156 th (21)
Myanmar	72 nd (3.0)	157 th (21)
Philippines	89 th (2.6)	85 th (38)
Sri Lanka	85 th (2.7)	85 th (38)
Pakistan	108 th (2.3)	126 th (29)
South Korea	97 th (2.4)	43 rd (55)
India	50 th (3.4)	85 th (38)
Mongolia	119 th (2.1)	80 th (39)
Thailand	129 th (1.9)	85 th (38)
Bangladesh	136 th (1.8)	145 th (25)
Nepal	122 nd (2.1)	126 th (29)

Sources: Schwab (2014, p. 409) and Transparency International (2014).

The level of public trust in politicians tends to be higher in Singapore and Hong Kong, which have been effective in curbing corruption, than in Bangladesh and Nepal, which have very high levels of perceived corruption. Table 2 shows the relationship between public trust in politicians and the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) scores of 22 Asian countries in 2014.

2. Establish a single, independent ACA instead of multiple ACAs.

If the government and citizens in those Asian countries afflicted by widespread corruption wish to improve the status quo, what can they do? They have three options. The first option, which should be avoided, is not to follow the examples of China, India, Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam, which have continued to rely for many years on ineffective multiple ACAs to address the problem of rampant corruption, without success. The multiple ACAs in these five countries are ineffective because of their overlapping functions, lack of coordination, and competition for limited resources, which has resulted in "turf wars" among themselves (Quah, 2013a, p. 241). The second option, which is practised by Denmark, Finland and New Zealand, is to strengthen existing institutions in the country without creating an ACA. The final option in combating corruption was initiated by the creation of the CPIB in Singapore in October 1952, and emulated by the establishment of the ICAC in Hong Kong in February 1974 (Quah, 2013a, p. 250).

The success of the CPIB and ICAC in curbing corruption has led to the proliferation of single ACAs in many Asian countries. However, unlike the CPIB and ICAC, the ACAs in these countries are ineffective in curbing corruption because of their lack of political will and unfavourable policy contexts (Quah, 2013b, pp. 21-22). In other words, the strategy of relying on a single ACA in a country will only be effective if the incumbent government provides it with sufficient legal powers, budget, personnel, and operational autonomy.

3. Political leaders and senior civil servants must be held accountable for their corrupt behaviour.

A government is committed to combating corruption if it ensures that its political leaders and senior civil servants are accountable for their actions, especially if they have committed corrupt acts. Thus, the third strategy for nurturing political will is by holding those political leaders and senior bureaucrats who are corrupt accountable for their misconduct.

In China, the political leaders must demonstrate their political will to minimize corruption by abandoning the protection of corrupt Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members from investigation and prosecution by the procuratorates. Those CCP members found guilty of disciplinary offences are punished according to the severity of their offences, ranging from a warning to the most severe penalty of expulsion from the CCP and transfer to the judicial system for those accused of accepting bribes exceeding 5,000 yuan. Flora Sapio (2005, pp. 8-9) contends that party cadres who are being investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) are "shielded by what is generally conceived as a safe nest ensuring their exemption from criminal punishment." Lening Zhang (2001, p. 28) contends that the CCP prefers to punish corrupt party officials by relying on "internal resolution" instead of imposing legal penalties for corrupt offences to save face and prevent the erosion of official authority.

The Discipline Inspection Commissions (DICs) can delay the transfer of criminal corruption cases to the procuratorates to enable the corrupt CCP members to cover their tracks or destroy incriminating evidence. Furthermore, the DICs can also appropriate criminal corruption cases by imposing disciplinary sanctions against corrupt CCP members instead of transferring them to the procuratorates to spare them from harsher legal penalties. Indeed, "by protecting corrupt party members from investigation and prosecution by the procuratorates, the CCP is encouraging its members to be corrupt rather remain honest" (Quah, 2013c, p. 82).

4. Corruption should not be used by the government as a weapon against its political opponents.

As an ACA is a powerful agency, the government should not abuse its powers by using corruption as a weapon against its political opponents. However, in reality, "corruption charges are increasingly used as a means to discredit rivals, rather than as

an effort to clean up politics" because "the tendency to use corruption charges to settle political scores is widespread" in many Asian countries (Djalal, 2001, pp. 32-33).

In China, anti-corruption campaigns have been used against political opponents to undermine their power base in the CCP. According to Joseph Fewsmith (2001, p. 231), "charging one's opponents (or their close followers) with corruption - a charge that seems increasingly true of most officials - had become a weapon of choice for political maneuver" in China. Indeed, "senior party officials like Chen Xitong, Chen Liangyu, and Bo Xilai were prosecuted for corruption not only because they were guilty of corrupt offences, but more importantly, because they had threatened the consolidation of power of political leaders like Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping, respectively" (Quah, 2013c, p. 83). In July 2014, the CCDI investigated Zhou Yongkang, the Minister of Public Security from 2002-2007, for corruption and the procuratorates confiscated US\$16.05 billion worth of assets from his many residences in seven provinces in China (Tang, 2014). Zhou was expelled from the CCP on December 5, 2014, not only because of his corruption offences but more importantly for his conspiracy with Bo Xilai to challenge the leadership of Xi Jinping.

Political leaders in China will fail to minimize corruption if they continue to rely on using corruption as the weapon of choice against their political foes. In other words, political leaders in Asian countries can demonstrate their political will in curbing corruption by avoiding the use of corruption as a weapon against their political opponents.

5. Those found guilty of corruption must be punished according to the law, regardless of their status, position, or political affiliation.

Corruption thrives in Asian countries like China, India, Indonesia and the Philippines because their citizens perceive it as a low risk, high reward activity as corrupt offenders are unlikely to be detected and punished. By contrast, corruption is perceived as a high risk, low reward activity in Singapore and Hong Kong, which are perceived to be the least corrupt city-states in Asia because corrupt offenders are likely to be caught and severely punished (Quah, 2011, p. 18).

Table 3: Punishment of Chinese Communist Party Cadres in China, 1993-1998

Rank of Cadres	Disciplined by CCP	Investigated by CCP	Sentenced by Courts	Sentenced as % of Disciplined
Provincial/Ministerial	87 (0.3%)	15 (0.1%)	9 (0.5%)	10.3%
Prefect/Department	2,205 (7.6%)	616 (5.0%)	201 (10.5%)	9.1%
County/Division	26,609 (92.1%)	11,712 (94.9%)	1,705 (89.0%)	6.4%
Total	28,901 (100%)	12,343 (100%)	1,915 (100%)	6.6%

Source: Pei (2006, p. 153, Table 4.4).

In China, the low probability of detection and punishment is a major cause of corruption as Minxin Pei (2006, p. 153) found that only 1,915 (or 6.6 per cent) of the 28,901 CCP cadres who were disciplined by the CCP were sentenced by the courts (see

Table 3). This means that if a party member commits a corrupt offence, he or she has only a 6.6 per cent probability of being prosecuted. With such a low probability of being caught for corrupt offences, it is not surprising that many senior officials are willing to assume the low risk for committing such offences (Burns, 2004, pp. 43-44).

Andrew Wedeman (2009, p. 26) compared the impact of the anti-corruption campaigns in China from 1992-1996 and 2005-2006 and found that corruption had deteriorated during the second period as the risk of corrupt offenders being caught was significantly reduced because the time lag between the offence and arrest of the offender increased from 20 months during 1992-1996 to 63 months during 2005-2006. Among the average number of 30,000 public officials charged with economic crimes annually, more than 20,000 officials (66.7 per cent) were remanded to the courts for trial, but only 5,000 officials (16.7 per cent) were imprisoned for five years or more (Wedeman, 2009, p. 27).

Further evidence of the low probability of detecting and punishing corrupt offenders in China is reflected in the low percentage of prosecuting corrupt officials, which varies from 2.9 per cent in 2004 to 13.1 per cent in 2005, even though the number of CCP members punished by the CCDI has increased from 97,260 to 190,000 during 1992-2006. Among the 115,143 CCP members disciplined during 1992-2006, 44,836 (38.9 per cent) were warned, and 32,289 (28 per cent) of them were given a serious warning. This means that two-thirds of those party members who were disciplined "got away with only a mild to serious warning that appeared to have no real punitive consequences" (Pei, 2008, pp. 230-232).

As not all officials who are suspected of corruption and investigated in China are convicted, Yongshun Cai (2015, pp. 130-131) contends that some corrupt officials are punished less severely for three reasons. First, those corrupt officials who are cooperative, make voluntary confessions, provide information on the corruption of other officials, and return illegal income to the government, are punished less severely. Second, some corrupt officials receive less harsh punishment depending on the definition of the amount of money embezzled or bribes received. Third, where there are many corrupt officials, only seriously corrupt officials are punished as the less corrupt officials are exempted from punishment to avoid paralyzing the operations of the city or local government. Indeed, "when the number of corrupt agents becomes too high, curbing corruption becomes too difficult, if not impossible" (Cai, 2015, p. 131). The inconsistencies in investigating and punishing corrupt officials at both the central and local levels in China have undermined the credibility of the disciplinary agencies and encouraged the belief among officials that they would unlikely be punished for corrupt offences (Cai, 2015, p. 133).

In short, the governments in Asian countries must demonstrate their political will in curbing corruption by punishing those found guilty of corruption offences, regardless of their status, position or political affiliation.

6. Rely on CSOs and mass media to curb corruption when the government lacks the political will to do so.

Peter Eigen (2004, p. 13), the founder of Transparency International, contends that when governments and the private sector are unable to curb transnational corruption, environmental destruction, and human rights violations, CSOs have "stepped into the void" in these areas of "failed governance." As many governments in Asian countries have failed to curb corruption effectively, it is not surprising that many CSOs have emerged in these countries to compensate for their governments' inadequacies by launching anti-corruption programmes. Table 4 provides details of the mission and vision of four CSOs in India, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Table 4: Four Asian Civil Society Organizations with Anti-Corruption Programmes

Organization	Country	Mission/Vision
Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Government (CCAG)	Philippines (formed in 1986) www.ccagg.com	To establish a self-reliant community of a potentially mature and economically emancipated citizenry who work for good government.
Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ)	Philippines (formed in 1989) www.pcij.org	Promoting investigative reporting on current issues in Philippine society and encouraging the development of investigative journalism within the Philippine press.
Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW)	Indonesia (formed in 1998) www.antikorupsi.org	To support the creation of a clean bureaucracy, politics and economic system.
5 th Pillar (zero rupee note with anti-bribes pledge)	India (formed in 2008) www.5thpillar.org	To encourage, enable and empower every citizen of India to eliminate corruption at all levels of society.

Source: Compiled by the author from the websites of the four CSOs.

A strong civil society is critical for combating corruption because it provides the ACAs with critical information and feedback, a framework of values, an organizational base and skills needed by citizens to act on shared problems, and alternatives to mistreatment by corrupt officials. In other words, a strong civil society reduces the costs of corruption by providing its members with the space and organizational capabilities required to act against corruption (Johnston and Kpundeh, 2005, pp. 151, 163).

Unfortunately, the CSOs in Asian countries have encountered many obstacles in combating corruption namely: a hostile environment, limited resources, and the fact that many of their members are concerned with basic survival needs. Consequently, CSOs in those poor, highly corrupt and undemocratic Asian countries face many constraints and find it difficult to develop and survive. Indeed, without adequate resources and the ability to influence those in power, the anti-corruption efforts of CSOs in many Asian

countries are ineffective and "more likely to result in risk, repression and apathy" (UNDP, 2008, p. 139).

Conclusion

Denmark and New Zealand were ranked first and second respectively on Transparency International's 2014 CPI with scores of 92 and 91, followed by Finland, which was ranked third with a score of 89. Among the Asian countries, Singapore and Hong Kong SAR were ranked 7th and 17th with scores of 84 and 74, respectively. On the other hand, India was ranked 85th among the 175 countries with a score of 38. Why are the first five countries more effective than India in curbing corruption?

The short answer is: good governance and political will. ... The governments of the five richer countries are committed not only to minimizing corruption, but also to ensuring good governance. ... If a country is well governed like the five countries, it is less likely to suffer from corruption if the government implements impartially the anti-corruption measures. On the other hand, if a country is poorly governed like India, it is more likely to be afflicted by rampant corruption because the government lacks the political will to implement impartially the anti-corruption measures (Quah, 2013a, pp. 236-237).

The government's lack of political will in curbing corruption in India has resulted in citizens being subjected to the daily routine and frustrations of petty corruption, as reflected in the complaints by two software engineers. First, Varun Mishra has lamented that "You pay for a birth certificate, a death certificate. All your life you pay. And for what? For things that should be free" (quoted in Burke, 2011, p. 3). Second, Ballaji, a 24-year old information technology engineer from Chennai protested against corruption in India in April 2011 because "everyone's corrupt, all of us, and it has to end When I drive my car badly and get stopped [by the police], I pay a bribe. If I want a birth certificate or a copy of my school certificate, I pay a bribe. Whenever I have any sort of dealing with the government, I pay a bribe." (quoted in Astill, 2013, p. 248).

Table 5: Linkage between Fragile States in Asia and Corruption

Country	Fragile States Index 2014 Rank & Score (N = 178)	Corruption Perceptions Index 2014 Rank & Score (N = 175)
Afghanistan	7 th (106.5)	172 nd (12)
Pakistan	10 th (103.0)	126 th (29)
Myanmar	24 th (94.3)	156 th (21)
North Korea	26 th (94.0)	174 th (8)
Bangladesh	29 th (92.8)	145 th (25)
Sri Lanka	30 th (92.6)	85 th (38)
Nepal	31 st (91.0)	126 th (29)
Timor-Leste	31 st (91.0)	133 rd (28)
Cambodia	40 th (88.5)	156 th (21)
Philippines	52 nd (85.3)	85 th (38)

Sources: Fund for Peace (2014) and Transparency International (2014).

Finally, the critical importance of political will in curbing corruption is confirmed by the close linkage between poor governance and rampant corruption in Asian countries. As failed states are "consumed by internal violence and cease delivering positive political goods to their inhabitants," it is not surprising that corruption "thrives on an unusually destructive scale" in these states because there is both widespread "petty or lubricating corruption" and "escalating levels of venal corruption" (Rotberg, 2004, p. 8). Table 5 shows that in 2014 the fragile states of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Myanmar, North Korea, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Timor-Leste, Cambodia and Philippines have extremely high levels of perceived corruption as reflected in their low CPI scores, ranging from 8 for North Korea to 38 for the Philippines and Sri Lanka.

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