

The Sino-Japanese Relations from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao: Continuities and Changes of Beijing's Policy Towards Japan Since the Mid-1990s

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Abstract

After the Cultural Revolution (1966—1976), it is undeniable that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did suffer from severe governance crisis, ranging from 'Confidence, Trust and Religious Belief' among the populace in China. In the understanding of Deng Xiaoping along with his rise of power in 1978, the CCP has been since then supported by three main pillars: economic growth, stability and nationalism. Especially in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, nationalism has long been known as a progressively notable 'artifact' to legitimize one-party rule. From the mid-1990s, China has also witnessed the emergence of a genuinely society-driven nationalism. Although the anti-foreignism stance of society-driven nationalism has at most gone along with the official-led ideopolitical education, its independent existence would still more or less undermine the Party's hegemonic status over the nationalist discourse. In this particular scenario, nationalism will backfire if it goes too far beyond the CCP's control. In this paper, with regard to the development of Sino-Japanese relations from the mid-1990s, I am going to explore how and why nationalism in post-Deng Xiaoping China can be understood as a double-edged sword from the perspective of CCP. Continuities and changes of the Beijing's policy towards Japan under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao administrations will be further discussed as well.

Introduction

A considerable amount of groups in addition to organizations have their own political systems which make binding decisions for that company, university, college, football club and family. That of course will involve decisions about how money will be spent, who will get which jobs, in addition to how the time will be allocated. With reference to the field of politics, in particular political science, such as the ideas provided by Easton (1979), systematic political scientists have put their attention on the binding decisions made by the political system and implemented for the society as a whole.

In light of the modern state-society relations, people would least likely accept such

binding decisions simply because of coercion. According to Birch (2001), he pointed out the fact that the political authority should be widely accepted by most population so that it may be a sign of the loss of authority when the military, police, secret police and surveillance are always exercised out within the territory. Political legitimacy, differing from coercion as another source of power, is treated as the ultimate pillar which bestows a government with the right to rule in the long run. If a government lacks political legitimacy, there are only relations of power but no authority between leaders and followers. Much of that government's resources will therefore be consumed for minimum survival rather than provided for good governance at large.

In the words of Barker (1990), political legitimacy can be defined as 'the belief in the rightness of a state... so that command are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest... because subject believe that they ought to obey'. Simply speaking, it is the subjective belief of people that a government has the authority to rule, and the existing political arrangements and institutions should be noted as the most appreciated ones which can obtain popular support within the territory. Hence, there is probably no exaggeration to say that political legitimacy should be regarded as the prerequisite for a government for maintaining its own stability for a longer time span by rendering laws and decisions authoritative so that the populace can abide by those decisions made by that government.

Political legitimacy is of utmost importance in governance without questioning. Yet the CCP miserably underwent an inevitable legitimacy crisis after the 10-year's Cultural Revolution (1966—1976). Having suffered from this turmoil, the CCP did encounter an inevitable governance crisis by then: it was simultaneously plagued by the lack of confidence and trust from the populace, in addition to the aftermath of banishing religious beliefs in the people of China. Deng Xiaoping, with his rise in 1978, steered China away from Hua Guofeng's idea of 'Whateverism'. This marked the beginning of a new chapter of Chinese history: the era of economic reform and the 'Open Door Policy', in which the order and stability was restored. Since then, the CCP has sustained and legitimized itself by harnessing these three important pillars: economic growth, stability and nationalism (Laliberte and Lanteigne, 2008).

For the governance of China after Deng Xiaoping (i.e., under the rulership of Jiang Zemin and later Hu Jintao), nationalism has been regarded as a progressively crucial 'artifact' besides of economic growth and stability to legitimize one-party rule. Borrowing the words from Gries (2004a), the 'Chinese nationalist politics today exhibits the claim-response dynamic central to the negotiation of legitimacy in all political systems. Popular nationalists both support and challenge the state's claims to legitimacy—and issue their own rival nationalist claims. And the Party (i.e., the CCP) both suppresses and responds to challenges to its nationalistic credentials. The suppression of legitimate nationalistic claims, however, causes the Party to lose face and authority before the Chinese people. Such suppression signals a reversion to

coercive forms of power, undermining regime stability. Successful responses to popular nationalist demands, by contrast, allow the Party to gain face before nationalist audiences, solidifying regime legitimacy'. As Gries stated in his analysis, nationalism since the mid-1990s in domestic China has encompassed an in-depth hidden meaning beyond the original notion known as 'sense of nation': both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have tremendously turned nationalism into a significant source of political legitimacy which can help them generate spontaneous or voluntary obedience and even support for their governance within the nation.

With the nature of a double-edged sword, yet nationalism can still sometime backfire once this tool goes too far beyond the CCP's control. With reference to the Sino-Japanese relations since the mid-1990s, in the following sections, I am going to explore how and why nationalism in post-Deng Xiaoping China can be understood as a dilemma from the perspective of CCP. By looking into how nationalism in China had influenced and shaped the country's diplomatic tactics for Japan, both continuities and changes of the Beijing's policy towards the island nation throughout the times of Jiang Zemin and also Hu Jintao rulership are to be discussed respectively in this paper.

Continuities of Beijing's Policy Towards Japan between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao Administrations

Close Bilateral Economic Relations

In 2001—2006, at the time when Koizumi served as the Prime Minister of Japan, the Sino-Japanese relations were in one of the worst stages, yet the bilateral economic relations between China and Japan did not deteriorate as indicated in *Figure 1*: the Sino-Japanese trade value between 1999 and 2008 still followed a general trend of growth (as cited in Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2009). As Wan (2006) wrote, such bilateral trade in particular saw a significant rise during the time of Jiang Zemin as the Party Secretary (1989—2002). The trend had soared, almost exponentially, from 2002 to 2012 during the era of Hu Jintao. According to the record of Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), a Japanese government-related organization that strives to promote mutual trade and investment between Japan and the rest of the world, China became Japan's biggest trading partner regarding the dollar volume of exports and imports in 2009, as the global economic downturn in 2008 massively jeopardized the well-being of Japan-US trade partnership (as cited in People's Daily Online, 19 Aug 2009).

The intention of keeping consistent and most importantly mutually beneficial Sino-Japanese economic relations could be clearly detected from the remarks of the government personals of both countries. Li Peng said that 'China's economic growth is not a threat to Japan' (as cited in Wan, 2006); equally, the then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi openly warned that 'the Chinese and Japanese economies are complementary' (as cited in Wan, 2006). Their respective outward economic policies had remained of

stable regardless of the decline of the general Sino-Japanese relations since the mid-1990s until the early 21st century. He (2007) later interpreted that in 'the absence of obvious economic damage (between China and Japan), there should be no strong economic incentives to alter their diplomatic positions'.

These relatively stable bilateral economic relations from the Jiang Zemin era to Hu Jintao administration had primarily to do with the CCP's practical need, which was explained by Samuel Huntington as below. Political legitimacy can be derived from procedural and in the meantime performance means (Huntington, 1991). However, the western-style procedural legitimacy of course cannot be drawn by those non-democratic regimes such as China. One of the tangible characteristics in this particular sense is that elections held in most non-democratic regimes have not been practicing the universal suffrage, resulting in the under-representation for public volition. Without accumulating sufficient public consent and also support from the procedural channel, the CCP can at most be granted political legitimacy from good performance. Conspicuously, a non-democratic state (especially for China after Deng Xiaoping) has no other options but tends to heavily rely on 'performance legitimacy' (i.e., the GDP-led economic growth) for its survival. Thus China's close bilateral economic ties with Japan from the mid-1990s can be rendered as one of the effective means to help China itself further its own economic modernization and globalization, which in turn consolidates the CCP's reign on China.

The close bilateral economic relations from Jiang Zemin era to Hu Jintao administration can be decoded by the notable factor of 'liberal internationalism' (Nakai, as cited in Suzuki, 2009). Although the Sino-Japanese trade relations are not trouble-free, China's ascending integration into the world economy (especially when China was finally approved to join WTO in the late 2001) has increased the likelihood that economic disputes will not be overpoliticized and will instead be settled rather smoothly. As the deepening economic interdependence is exceedingly conducive to reduce political tensions (i.e., historical and territorial disputes) among different polities such as between China and Japan, as a result, the two countries have a more realistic concern (i.e., economic consideration).

Nationalism as the Legitimation Tool

Since the Third Plenum of the Eleventh CCP Central Committee held in December 1978, the paramount importance of 'Marxism-Leninism' and 'Mao Zedong Thought' in China has gradually eroded with the launch of Deng Xiaoping's economic reform and the 'Open-door Policy' in line with the demise of Hua Guofeng's 'Whateverism'. Particularly after the 'June Fourth Incident' occurred in 1989, the CCP initially hoped but eventually failed to re-portray Lei Fung as the role-model for all Chinese youngsters to learn in searching their livelihood (Reed, 1991). In spite of all the efforts paid by the CCP, a study conducted by Zhang and Zhang in Jaocheng county of Shanxi province in 1990 revealed a counterproductive outcome: Lei Fung was extremely unpopular chief

amongst most secondary school students. What was done by Lei Fung seemed naïve and also laughable to them, and most respondents agreed that money was their chief concern instead (as cited in Rosen, 1993).

In order to allow more room for introducing reforms, considerable efforts were made by the post-Mao reformists in order to loosen up the ideological atmosphere. This pragmatic approach has facilitated a more rational management of the economy and most importantly led to economic prosperity. As *Figure 2* indicates, the post-1978 economic reforms have been able to generate a rapid GDP-oriented economic growth in China's 30 provinces (Wang, 2006). However, at the same time, one should bear in mind that not all Chinese have benefited from the economic reforms accordingly.

On 8 October 2006, the People's Daily Online published an article concerning the Gini coefficient of China. As an indicator to measure of income disparity, the Gini coefficient has risen to 0.46, which is considered as an alarming level, whereas other unofficial academic researchers suggested that it could have risen to 0.49 (as cited in Saich, 2011). In present-day China, there are indeed numerous deprived groups such as a large number of workers being 'laid-off' or even unemployed under the restructuring of State-owned Enterprises (SOEs). As Cai (2006) pointed out, these 'Chinese "laid-off" workers often take actions to achieve concrete economic goals, so their participation is determined by estimations of success and the risks or costs involved'. Thus the underlying question for the government becomes the question of what can be done to dampen the workers' incentives to take action in order to proceed with reforms without hindrance. The author's observation above reveals explicitly that the mass 'laid-off' or the *de facto* unemployment in townships and cities has been and will be dangerous for the long-term CCP governance, as there lays a great potential for social unrest. According to the Ministry of Public Security, even though such official data might be largely underestimated, the occurrence of 'Mass Incidents' (i.e., 'Mass Incidents' officially stem from 'Contradictions within the Populace' with reference to the CCP's doctrine, and can be broadly defined as 'large-scale demonstrations, which have the potential to develop into violent stand-offs between crowds of demonstrators and the authorities, or violent attacks on government organs, factories, or other property') in China has still dramatically climbed from 8,709 in 1993 to 87,000 in 2005 (as cited in Saich, 2011). Estimates by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) later gives an embarrassing figure of over 90,000 'Mass Incidents' in 2006 and further unspecified increases in 2007 and 2008 (as cited in Saich, 2011).

With the rapid decline of those communist ideologies and the growing cases of those socio-economic problems in China, nationalism undoubtedly became an alternative legitimation tool for the CCP under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to promote social cohesion and ensure political stability in the nation. This could be observed by the response of China in regard to the collision among a Chinese trawler and two Japanese Coast Guard ships in September 2010. The Chinese Government reacted with

a series of diplomatic measures aiming at safeguarding China's sovereignty in the disputed waters of the East China Sea against Japan (Beukel, 2011). The then Premier Wen Jiabao openly and seriously urged the Japanese Government to release the detained Chinese captain immediately and unconditionally in no time. In the end, Japan was 'willing' to act in accordance with his demand.

It is ostensible that the development of the above Sino-Japanese territorial dispute concurred with the discernment of Przystup (2010): the Chinese Government, regardless of the leadership of Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao, was interested in performing a high-level diplomacy with Japan (i.e., the deep and open involvement of Chinese Government's top leaders in Sino-Japanese conflicts), such as through state-controlled media including CCTV and the People's Daily, in the purpose of winning applause from most ordinary Chinese people. Apparently, the CCP tends to make its claim to political legitimacy based on the promise of delivering on nationalistic aspirations to a comprehensive rise in the global community during the 21st century. Differing from the less than desirable official reaction to foreign encroachment in the 19th and 20th centuries, 'the Party (i.e., the CCP) is now dedicated to restoring China to greatness as a power in the world and thereby redressing all past humiliations. Under its (i.e., the CCP) leadership, despite several setbacks after 1949 (c.f., frequent occurrence of 'Mass Incidents' in present-day China), the Chinese people still 'rise up' (Burton, 2008).

Nationalism as the Diplomatic Tool Against 'Containment Policy'

With the dismemberment of USSR, the bipolar political system was dissolved along with it. However, since 1991, a new bipolar world order (i.e., US vs. China) has redeveloped as US President George Bush spoke of a 'New World Order' (Best et al., 2008), which is a system involving the cooperation of diverse states against common threats and claims to be less confrontational and more institutionalized. The system serves to consolidate military, political and economic position of the states involved. Being the most influential socialist state in the Post-Cold War world, China since the early 1990s has been identified as the biggest potential enemy of US.

With this bipolar mentality, even though there have been continual conflicts over bilateral trade and the opening of Japanese market since the Pizza Accord in 1985, different cabinets in Japan still have a very high intention of continuing, and if possible, even strengthening or stepping up the alliance with the US according to the blueprint of Yoshida doctrine foreign policy model. Even until the Koizumi's cabinet of Japan in 2001—2006, the Japanese foreign policy was still more or less the same as the old one by retaining both ties and constrains to the US's interests and right-wing nationalist ideals (Heazle, 2007). This fact was evident in the increasing support for regional defense efforts offered by the US in the Asia-Pacific region (Sutter, 2005), which echoed with the prior Hashimoto's decision to 'reaffirm' or 'redefine' the 'US-Japan Security Treaty' through the announcement of 'Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security Alliance for the 21st Century' in 1996. Borrowing the ideas of Edstrom, in the reason of

the 'Lost Decade' and 'Great-Power Bias', 'increasing myopia seems a perfectly rational reaction for a country (i.e., Japan) having a security treaty with the remaining superpower (i.e., the US)' (as quoted in Heazle, 2007).

While China has gradually become an economic powerhouse in the early 21st century, the 'China Threat' will be more and more popular in the US. Hence, the US 'Containment Policy' with Japan towards China seems to be inevitable. In line with the explanation of 'Power Transition Theory', it is considered that if China continues its remarkable GDP growth, such non-democratic regime (i.e., China) will sooner or later transform itself into a military power and finally engage in an unavoidable and keen competition with the hegemonic status of the US (Mearsheimer, 2001). The recent rise of China has already and thus dismayed Japan, especially when China replaced Japan as the second largest world economy in 2010 (BBC News Business, 14 Feb. 2011).

Facing the 'Containment Policy' under the coordination of the US as well as burgeoning popularity of 'China Threat' among the Western world plus Japan during the early 21st century, the CCP, regardless of whose leadership, tends to make good use of nationalism as an effective tool to downplay, if not frighten both the US and Japan of ever trying to contain China. This approach, according to the CCP itself, can be known as the actualization of China's 'Peaceful Rise' in the globe, and at the same time such harmonious Sino-foreign relationship will continuously help China stimulate its sustainable export-oriented economic growth (i.e., nearly 70% for the China's annual GDP) through the mass injection of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as time passes.

Changes of Beijing's Policy Towards Japan between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao Administrations

Deterioration of China's Good Neighbourly Policy

Compared with the Jiang Zemin era, the CCP under Hu Jintao administration tends to adopt a more 'hard line' policy towards the historical and particularly territorial disputes with Japan. The territorial row over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan in 1996 would serve to manifest the CCP's approach under Jiang Zemin. Nevertheless, the anti-Japanese mass demonstrations in China during 2005 would be another good example to depict the dramatic changes under Hu Jintao rulership.

When a group of right-wing Japanese landed on the Islands and hence set up a lighthouse as a symbol of Japanese sovereignty in 1996, both the Chinese and Japanese governments responded by reinforcing their claims over the Islands. This eventually led to a series of spontaneous anti-Japanese demonstrations on Chinese streets, which were efficiently suppressed by the CCP within a short period of time (Weatherley, 2006). The suppressive measures utilised were as follows: the then vice-minister of foreign affairs went to Peking University personally to ensure that students remained calm; the idea that *China Can Still Say No*, which was critical to the CCP's foreign policy towards Japan, was banned since then; students were not allowed to access the internet for ten

days (Gries, 2004b). Apparently in Jiang Zemin era, the CCP merely repeated its claims over the territorial dispute in a verbal manner but still refused to empower occurrence of those society-driven demonstrations. Nationalism under Jiang Zemin leadership as revealed from this example was predominately state-led.

Yet this scenario changed immensely under Hu Jintao governance. The 2005's anti-Japanese demonstrations in 18 China's cities would best exemplify such an obvious change in approach: the Chinese Government did allow the violence to take place for a number of days before suppression. The protests reached the climax on 16 April in Shanghai, where thousands of Chinese people protested outside the Japan Consulate-General. Many bottles and stones were thrown at the building. The police later reported that 52 'hooligans' rather than patriots were arrested. Until that moment, Hu Jintao began to take oppressive measures to curb those anti-Japanese protests (e.g., arresting rock throwers; closing down excessively inflammatory websites). From all these, it can be seen that Hu Jintao, in comparison, was more inclined to opt for a more 'hard line' policy towards Japan: the then Chinese Government initially seemed to have some ulterior motives as it gave a free hand to the outbreak of anti-Japanese rallies in the 18 China's cities. As seen from this scenario, nationalism has clearly been altered from a state-led approach to a society-driven one. Since the relationship between the Chinese Government and populace has become more and more ambiguous under the rapid erosion of CCP's legitimacy in the post-Deng Xiaoping China, Hu Jintao was under this circumstances coerced to pay a higher governance cost in domestic China (e.g., the initial tolerance towards large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in 2005), which lied upon an obvious message that the CCP will be the sole pioneer in leading China to prosperity and national prestige in the foreseeable future.

The anti-Japanese mass demonstrations and Chinese Government's response in 2005 were meanwhile in line with the observation of Lam (2006): 'the leadership (in China) made no effort to control either the number of demonstrators or their actions. One consideration might be that as in the past, Beijing wanted to put pressure on the Japanese Government by flexing the "people opinion" card'. The antagonism shown by the CCP implies that the Chinese Government under Hu Jintao tended to exploit popular outbursts to intimidate Japan, especially when Japan wanted to obtain a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2005. Gries's (2004b) analysis again best explained the transition of nationalism from state-led to society-driven in China: 'the Party's (i.e., the CCP's) movement away from suppression and towards cooption or acquiescence suggests that a popular nationalism is currently emerging in China that increasingly challenges the party-state. Struggling to keep up with popular nationalist demands, the Party is slowly losing its hegemony over Chinese nationalism'.

Nationalism as an Engine to Marginalize the Sino-Japanese Cooperation

In light of the ascent of online nationalism, Hu Jintao administration expended

abundant resources in order to monitor public sentiments, internet debates and popular media coverage on nationalistic issues. Each ministry has been required to submit a daily 'Internet Report'. As Reilly (2010) wrote, these 'Internet Report(s)' compiled by Xinhua News Agency and also Public Security Bureau are surpassingly crucial for policy-making in China. Their utmost importance can be observed with the account of Chinese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing regarding the comments of 'netizens', 'I have read the comments before that our diplomacy is sometimes too "soft" or too "hard". We take such concerns seriously' (Li, as quoted in Zhang and Wang, 2003).

Indeed, the China's high-speed railway project (c.f., meanwhile known as the 'Shinkansen' project) should be regarded as a tangible case to demonstrate this. In 2002, the Chinese Government decided to issue contracts to foreign enterprises to assist the construction of the high-speed railway linking up Beijing and Shanghai, which the Japanese bid was at that moment openly warmed. On 31 May 2003, Hu Jintao explicitly told the then Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi that he would like to foster China-Japan cooperation in this railway project (as cited in Reilly, 2010). Despite all, online nationalism apparently shaped the later decision-making process and the ironical bidding result of China's high-speed railway project in 2003. Reilly (2010) commented thus, 'after public protests began in summer 2003, the decision became a highly contested political choice for the Chinese leadership (under Hu Jintao). Online protests interjected emotional factors into the decision making process and forced a more public debate while delaying decisions. Railway officials later indicated in private interviews that public emotion (against Japan) had become a critical factor in their considerations after 2003'. Further seeking to appease the public including those Chinese 'netizens', the then China's Railway Minister Liu Zhijun even announced, somewhat inaccurately, that the high-speed railway project would adopt an entirely domestic technology (as cited in Reilly, 2010).

The failure of this collaborative high-speed railway project between China and Japan in 2003 could be characterised as a typical pillory to indicate how the nationalistic sentiments could bluntly override the long-term strategic and economic interests of China. It was evident that comparing with the Jiang Zemin rulership, Beijing's policy towards Japan by Hu Jintao was 'increasingly reactive to nationalistic opinion, rather than proactive to China's national interests' (Gries, 2005). Perhaps with the fast development of modern communication technology including 'Microblogging' and 'WeChat' in China, nationalism has become prevalent and more influential in Chinese politics. Popular nationalists in China are now increasingly able to act contrary to the state. Yet the dilemma is that Hu Jintao administration could not simply ignore the populace voices or its political legitimacy would be questioned (Gries, as cited in Zhou, 2007). Similar to what a Peking University professor warned, 'the basic policy of our government (i.e., the Chinese Government) has been to be conciliatory to Japan and the rest of the world, but that policy has become less viable today, when (Chinese) people are demanding a harder line' (Kahn, as quoted in Zhou, 2007).

Conclusion


For China after Deng Xiaoping, the CCP has merely been able to attain political legitimacy particularly from the remarkable economic growth (i.e., such as the close economic ties with Japan) but not through consistent procedural means (i.e., universal suffrage in all levels) as in the Western world (Huntington, 1991). Without doubt, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao in particular sense should understand that nationalism has been considered as another potent force to legitimize the CCP supremacy in post-Deng Xiaoping China. Nationalism would further be treated as a powerful diplomatic weapon while dealing with other foreign countries such as Japan.

Yet due to the surge of popular nationalism since the mid-1990s, such an irretrievable trend has gradually spoiled the Beijing's policy towards Japan from the leadership of Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. In the mid-1990s, the CCP headed by Jiang Zemin mostly fended off direct confrontation with Japan by forbidding Chinese nationalist activists from taking substantial anti-Japanese action. Instead, the then Chinese Government at most expressed diplomatic gestures or claims to Japan in the initial stage. Yet when Hu Jintao came into office in 2002, nationalism remarkably transformed as the key for him in managing social unrest and surviving politically in domestic China. This could further be evidenced by the immense use of the internet as a vehicle for online discussion, something which the CCP has found more difficult to control (Deans, 2004). In other words, if Hu Jintao had appeared 'too weak' to stand up to Japan, such domestic online critics from Chinese netizens could have more or less turned against him and even worse, someone might take it as an opportunity to use such nationalist appeals in mobilizing popular support for overthrowing the CCP.

With the increasingly society-driven demonstrations against Japan from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao rulership, such an independent role of nationalism has inevitably undermined the CCP's hegemonic status over the nationalist discourse even under the current fifth generation rulers headed by Xi Jinping. Worse still, such a society-driven nationalism in the foreseeable future may even ignore or reject the CCP as the only organ that can lead to national prestige. To score such nationalist legitimacy in the 21st century, the CCP has no alternative but will be 'coerced' to appease a group of 'angry youth' or those anti-foreign protestors known as a potential threat to the long-term CCP rule in China.

Appendices


Figure 1:
Trends in Japan's Trade by Country/ Region, 1999–2008



1) EU member countries were: 15 countries, before May 2004; 25, from May 2004 to Dec. 2006; 27, from Jan. 2007 onward.
Source: Ministry of Finance.

Source: as cited in Statistics Bureau of Japan, 2009

Figure 2:
Comparing GDP per capita for 30 provinces in China between 1978 and 2004



Source: Wang, 2006

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